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Section 1. | Institutional Theory of Privatization-Nationalization Assets |
| Chapter 1. | Institutional Theory of Privatization and Nationalization |
| | 1.1. | Privatization Process: Possible Benefits and Costs |
| | 1.2. | Principles and Criteria of Privatization Efficiency |
| | 1.3. | Nationalization: Institutional Possibilities (Price Criterion) |
| | 1.4. | Interaction Model of Public and Private Sectors |
| Chapter 2. | Structural Analysis of the Property: Optimum Principle |
| | 2.1. | The Necessity of Structural Analysis of Property and Formations of Privatization and Nationalization Criteria |
| | 2.2. | Optimum Principle of the Property Structure and Criteria of Privatization and Nationalization Expediency |
| | 2.3. | Privatization in Transitive Economies: Errors and Consequences |
Section 2. | Institutional Theory of Economic Reforms: Dysfunction and Changes Models |
| Chapter 3. | General “Theory” of Reforms |
| Chapter 4. | Institutions and Dysfunction of the Systems |
| Chapter 5. | Dysfunction of the Systems and Institutions: Economic Reforms |
| Chapter 6. | Typology of Economic Reforms |
Bibliography |
Oleg S. Sukharev Oleg S. Sukharev
(www.osukharev.com)
Professor, Head of Laboratory of Institutional Economics at the Institute of Problems of Market of the Russian Academy of Science. Chief researcher of the Institute of Economy RAS. Author of more than 20 books and more than 300 papers on institutional economics, macroeconomics policy, innovation theory of companies and industry, theory of economic growth and institutional change. Oleg S. Sukharev is the author of the concept of dysfunction of institutions and economic systems, has developed a method for measuring dysfunctional states and evaluating the effectiveness of the system of economic organization, and proposed a model of neo-Shumpeterian competition “innovator–conservative” with correction of the findings for economic policy.
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